v. Ireson
Citations
- 490 P.3d 963
- 2020 COA 157
Syllabus
Begley and Hirsch (plaintiffs) own residential property on which they wanted to demolish the existing house and build a new one. Ireson is their neighbor on one side, and Hoeckele was their neighbor on the other. Plaintiffs contracted with Forte Development Group, LLC (Forte) to undertake the project, and Forte demolished the existing home and began shoring work necessary to excavate the basement of the new home. However, Forte ceased work because, as alleged by plaintiffs, Ireson and Hoeckele, individually and through their attorney Gibbs, made statements, threats, and complaints that their properties had been damaged during construction. Plaintiffs further alleged that when excavation began again, Gibbs threatened police intervention and demanded that the work stop. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Ireson, Hoeckele, and Gibbs asserting claims for intentional interference with contract and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations. Ireson and Hoeckele then filed a lawsuit against plaintiffs and Forte. Hoeckele moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, arguing that her allegedly tortious conduct was protected by the litigation privilege. Ireson and Gibbs joined in the motion and the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that plaintiffs failed to allege that Ireson and Hoeckele caused Forte to breach the contract and that Gibbs's conduct was absolutely privileged. Plaintiffs appealed and a division of the Court of Appeals reversed. On the litigation privilege issue, the case was remanded to determine whether the prospective litigation was contemplated in good faith. On remand, Gibbs moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and awarded Gibbs costs as the prevailing party. Ireson and Hoeckele moved for summary judgment on the same grounds. The district court partially granted the motion, concluding that they could not be vicariously liable for Gibbs's conduct
How courts have described this case
Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.
- evaluating Blakely , 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)
- analyzing the relevant test for applying a constitutional rule retroactively and concluding that “the new constitutional rule announced in Blakely does not apply retroactively to sentences or resentences that were final when it issued”
- analyzing the relevant test for applying a constitutional rule retroactively and concluding that “the new constitutional rule announced in Blakely does not apply retroactively to sentences or resentences that were final when it issued”
- analyzing the relevant test for applying a constitutional rule retroactively and concluding that “the new constitutional rule announced in Blakely does not apply retroactively to sentences or resentences that were final when it issued”
- explaining why the purpose of the new rule in Blakely did not support retroactivity, that Florida had significantly relied on the old rule, and why applying Blakely retroactively would have an adverse impact on the administration of justice
- Johnson’s sentence became final in 2000, when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review
Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).
Sourced from CourtListener / Free Law Project (CC0).
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