v. Flynn

Citations

• 2019 COA 105

Syllabus

Garibay reported to police that while he was driving, his car approached a Cadillac, and the Cadillac driver stepped on his brakes, switched lanes, yelled profanities at Garibay, and pointed a gun at him. A police officer gave chase, but the Cadillac driver eluded the officer. During its investigation, police determined that the Cadillac's temporary tag was not associated with the Cadillac, but with a Buick registered to defendant's father. Garibay then identified defendant in a photographic array as the Cadillac driver. The police never located the Cadillac or the gun. A jury found defendant guilty of menacing, vehicular eluding, reckless endangerment, failure to stop at a red light, and speeding. On appeal, defendant contended that a new trial was required because the trial court erred by denying his motion to continue his trial to obtain substitute defense counsel. Here, although defendant expressed a general interest in retaining a specific lawyer, he had not taken any steps to retain the lawyer. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a continuance. Defendant next argued that the trial court erred in determining that no due process violation occurred when the prosecution suppressed exculpatory, material evidence. At trial, a detective testified about his efforts to locate the Cadillac or connect it to defendant. He testified that for a couple weeks he drove by defendant's house, but never saw the Cadillac in front of the house. He also testified that he checked Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) records and failed to find a Cadillac registered to defendant's address. The detective admitted that he failed to report these efforts in any police report, and as a result, neither was disclosed to the defense during discovery. Therefore, the prosecution suppressed this evidence. However, the detective's observations of defendant's house were not exculpatory, favorable to the defense, or material. But evidence of the DMV