United States v. Morrison

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United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), is a U.S. Supreme Court decision that found unconstitutional parts of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 for exceeding powers granted to the US Congress under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment 's Equal Protection Clause . Along with _United States v. Lopez _ (1995), it was part of a series of Rehnquist Court cases that limited Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.[1]

The case arose from a challenge to a provision of the Violence Against Women Act that provided victims of gender-motivated violence the right to sue their attackers in federal court. In a majority opinion joined by four other justices, Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that the Commerce Clause gave Congress only the power to regulate activities that were directly economic in nature, even if there were indirect economic consequences. Rehnquist also held that the Equal Protection Clause did not authorize the law because the clause applies only to acts by states, not to acts by private individuals.

In his dissenting opinion, Associate Justice David Souter argued that the majority revived an old and discredited interpretation of the Commerce Clause.

Contents

• 1 Background

• 2 Ruling

• 3 Majority opinion

  • 3.1 Commerce Clause

  • 3.2 Equal Protection Clause

• 4 Dissenting opinions

• 5 Reactions

• 6 See also

• 7 Notes

• 8 External links

Background

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In 1994, the United States Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act , which contained a provision at 42 U.S.C.  § 13981 for a federal civil remedy to victims of gender-based violence even if no criminal charges had been filed against the alleged perpetrator of that violence.

That fall, at Virginia Tech , freshman student, Christy Brzonkala, alleged that she was assaulted and raped repeatedly by students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford. Brzonkala initially stated that she visited Morrison and Crawford in their dormitory and they assaulted her,[2] but later claimed that she was assaulted in her dormitory, and had never met the students until that day.[3] During the school-conducted hearing on her complaint, Morrison admitted having sexual contact with her, but claimed that it was consensual.[4] College proceedings failed to punish Crawford who produced an alibi witness, but initially punished Morrison with a suspension (which was later struck down by the administration).[5] A state grand jury did not find sufficient evidence to charge either man with a crime.[6] Brzonkala then filed suit under the Violence Against Women Act.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia held that Congress lacked authority to enact 42 U.S.C. § 13981.[7] A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision 2–1.[8] The Fourth Circuit reheard the case _en banc _ and reversed the panel, upholding the district court.[9]

Ruling

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The Court's 5–4 decision invalidated the section of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 that gave victims of gender-motivated violence the right to sue their attackers in federal court. Chief Justice Rehnquist , writing for the majority, held that Congress lacked authority, under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment , to enact that provision.

However, the Act's program funding remained unaffected.

Majority opinion

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The majority opinion held that the challenged section of VAWA exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

Commerce Clause

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With regard to the Commerce Clause, the majority said that the result was controlled by _United States v. Lopez _ (1995), which had held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was unconstitutional. As in Morrison, the Court had stressed "enumerated powers" that limit federal power to maintain "a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local." Therefore, Lopez limited the scope of the Commerce Clause to exclude activity that was not directly economic in nature, even if there were indirect economic consequences. Lopez was the first significant limitation on the Commerce Clause powers of Congress in 53 years. The Lopez court stated that Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the "instrumentalities" (such as vehicles) used in interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Because VAWA's civil remedy concededly did not regulate the first or second categories, the Court analyzed its validity under the third in Morrison.

The majority concluded that acts of violence that were meant to be remedied by VAWA had only an "attenuated," not a substantial, effect on interstate commerce. The government, however, argued that "a mountain of evidence" indicated that such acts in the aggregate had a substantial effect. For that proposition the government relied on _Wickard v. Filburn _ (1942), which held that Congress could regulate an individual act that lacked a substantial effect on interstate commerce if, when aggregated, such acts had the required relation to interstate commerce. Once again, relying on Lopez, the majority replied that the aggregation principle of Wickard did not apply because economic effects of crimes against women were indirect and so they could not be addressed through the Commerce Clause.

The Court explained that the need to distinguish between economic activities that directly and those that indirectly affect interstate commerce was caused by "the concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local authority." Referring to Lopez, the Court stated, "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional State concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and State authority would blur." The majority further stated that "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign."

Justice Thomas's concurring opinion also expressed the concern that "Congress [was] appropriating State police powers under the guise of regulating commerce."

The majority, quoting from _NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. _ (1937), stated that the scope of the interstate commerce power

must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.

Equal Protection Clause

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The Court also held that Congress lacked the power to enact VAWA under the Fourteenth Amendment. It relied on the "state action" do

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