Union Mutual Life Insurance v. Kirchoff

Citations

• 169 U.S. 103
• 18 S. Ct. 260
• 42 L. Ed. 677
• 1898 U.S. LEXIS 1475

Syllabus

<p>Tbe defendant in error filed a bill against the plaintiff in error in a state court in Illinois to compel the performance of a contract to convey to her land in that State. The case proceeded to' judgment in plaintiff’s favor in the Supreme Court of the State, but was remanded with directions to take an account for the purpose of ascertaining for how much payment-should be directed. A writ of error, sued out from this court to review that judgment was dismissed here on the ground that the judgment was not final. It does not appear that any right or title had been specially set up or claimed under any statute of, or authority exercised under, the United States in the courts below, or in'the Supreme Court of Illinois, prior to such judgment of that Court. It appeared on the second . hearing that prior to September 10, 1884, the United States had seized the property for revenue taxes due from a firm then occupying it as a distillery, the defendant in error being in no way connected with the firm, that the property was sold, the Government bidding it in and taking a deed for it, and that the Government conveyed to the plaintiff in error. In the account stated the defendant in error was required to repay the amount so paid with interest.- It also appeared that the plaintiff in error, after the case went back, moved to amend its answer by setting up that title, as a right and title acquired and claimed under the Constitution, statutes and authority of the United States, which motion was refused, and the trial court disposed of the ease on other grounds. In the Appellate Court and in the Supreme Court the plaintiff in error contended that there was error in refusing its motion; but the Appellate Court held, and its decision was sustained by the Supreme Court, that it .was bound by the first decision, and that error could not be assigned, on the second appeal, for any cause existing at the time of the prior judgment. In this court it was contended that, at the-second tri