Town of Morgan City v. Dalton
Citations
- 112 La. 9
- 36 So. 208
- 1904 La. LEXIS 362
Syllabus
<p>ACTION ON CONTRACT — PLEADING — GENERAL DENIAL — SUIT BY MUNICIPALITY — LEASE —ESTOPPEL TO DENY TITLE.</p> <p>1. A general denial does not conflict with the special defense that the contract sued on was ultra vires of the plaintiff and contrary to public policy.</p> <p>2. Where suit is brought by a municipal corporation to recover money alleged to be due under a contract which has been practically executed upon its part, a citizen and taxpayer has no interest to defeat such recovery upon the ground that the contract was unauthorized.</p> <p>3. As between lessor and lessee, the law recognizes the validity of a lease by one person of the property of another, and it is well settled that he who enters upon and enjoys the possession of property as lessee cannot, by way of defense to an action to enforce the obligations of his lease, contest the title of his lessor, even though he himself may have acquired an adverse and better title.</p> <p>4. As the owner, who voluntarily becomes the lessee of one who has no title to the property leased, is estopped to deny, for the purposes of the lease, that the lessor is the owner, it follows, a fortiori, that a lessee, who cannot pretend to be the owner, is estopped, after enjoying possession, and merely to escape liability for the consideration therefor, to question the title of the lessor from whom such possession was received.</p> <p>5. Where a member of a municipal council actively participates in authorizing contracts involving the use by individuals of property under the control of the corporation, and is himself the principal beneficiary, he is hardly in a position to urge, as a defense to a suit brought to recover the consideration of a contract of that character, the benefit of which he has enjoyed and exhausted, that it was against good morals and public policy.</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>6. The power of a municipality to make temporary leases of portions of wharves in the interest of commerce has been recognized by ou
How courts have described this case
Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.
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Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).
Judges: Land, Monroe
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