Thompson v. Wanamaker's Trustee

Citations

• 268 Pa. 203
• 110 A. 770
• 1920 Pa. LEXIS 653

Syllabus

<p>Witts — •General devise — Power of appointment — Exercise of— Residuary estate — Real estate held under trust created by testator —Words and phrases — “Possessed” — “Seized” — •Act of June k, 1879, P. L. 88.</p> <p>1. Where one, possessing a power to dispose of real estate by his last will, and having no other real estate except that over which he possesses the power, devises generally all his real estate, such devise is deemed to be made in execution of the power, although such power is not specifically referred to, and although the particular real estate embraced in the power is not specifically described in the devise.</p> <p>2. Where testator, for reasons of his own, segregates his real estate, by placing it in trust, and in the deeds of trust, expressly, and first of all, reserves to himself the right of actual management or control during his life and of testamentary disposition at his death, and, at the time of making his will, he has no real estate other than that so held in trust, a general residuary devise of real estate in his will operates ex necessitate upon the properties held in trust as an exercise of his reserved right of testamentary disposition, and this without regard to the Act of June 4, 1879, P. L. 88.</p> <p>3. The fact that testator in his will grants to his executors power to lease and mortgage, or to sell, real estate of which he might be “possessed” or “seized” at the time of his death, does not prove that he intended to deal in his will with property other than that which he had placed in trust during his life.</p> <p>4. There is nothing in the words “possessed” or “seized” which in modern times imports legal title, as distinct from beneficial ownership.</p> <p>5. Where a testator executes several deeds of trust by which he places all of his real estate in trust, with power of management reserved to himself during his life, and power of testamentary disposition at his death, with limitation to children in default of appointment, and t