The Preserve at Boulder Hills, LLC v. Laura Kenyon, in her capacity as Finance Director for the Town of Richmond

Syllabus

These appeals arose out of a dispute between the Town of Richmond (the town) and a group of developers (the plaintiffs). Following a hearing on the town's motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for violations of substantive due process, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective business advantages, civil liability for crimes and offenses pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-1-2, and a civil violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute pursuant to G.L. 1956 chapter 15 of title 7. <br><br>On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the hearing justice committed four errors: (1) in ruling that the plaintiffs failed to state claims for crimes and offenses (count four) and civil RICO (count five) (2) in determining that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for tortious interference (counts two and three) (3) in failing to apply the Supreme Court's prior holdings that the public duty doctrine does not apply to intentional torts and (4) in finding that the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the voluntary payment doctrine. <br><br>The town cross-appealed, claiming defective and insufficient notice and arguing that the three-year statute of limitations barred all of the plaintiffs' claims, not just the claims for violations of substantive due process and tortious interference. The town additionally argued that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and that the town, as a government entity, could not be held liable under § 9 1-2 or civil RICO. The plaintiffs contested these arguments. <br><br>The Supreme Court held that the three-year statute of limitations applied to the plaintiffs' claims for civil liability for crimes and for civil RICO because the claims were claims in tort therefore, those claims were time-barred. The Court further determined that the continuing