Stoutenburgh v. Hennick

Citations

• 129 U.S. 141
• 9 S. Ct. 256
• 32 L. Ed. 637
• 1889 U.S. LEXIS 1671

Syllabus

<p>Tinder the authority conferred upon Congress by § 8, Article I, of the Constitution, “to make all laws which shall be necessary or proper for carrying into execution” the power “to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over” the District of Columbia, Congress.may constitute the District “ a body corporate for municipal purposes,” but can only authorize it to exorcise municipal powers.</p> <p>The Act of the Legislative Assembly of the District of Columbia of August 28, 1871, as amended June 20, 1872, relating to license taxes on persons engaging in trade, business or profession within the District, was intended to be a regulation of a purely municipal character-; but nevertheless the provision in clause 8, of § 21, which required commercial agents, engaged in offering merchandise for sale by sample, to take out and pay for such a license, is a regulation of interstate commerce, so far as applicable .to persons soliciting the sale of goods on behalf of individuals or firms doing business outside of the District, and it was not within the constitutional power of Congress to delegate to that legislature authority to enact a clause with such a provision, nor did it in fact do so in a grant of power for municipal purposes.</p> <p>Bobbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, and Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129, affirmed.</p> <p>The repeal or modification by Congress of clauses in a legislative act of th.. District of Columbia, which are separable and separably operative, is no ratification of another clause in it, equally separable and separably operative, which it was beyond the delegated or constitutional power of the Legislature of the District to enact.</p>