Stephan v. Hudock

Citations

• 4 Pa. Super. 474
• 1897 Pa. Super. LEXIS 148

Syllabus

<p>Married women — Contractual capacity under Act of 1887.</p> <p>Since the passage of the Act of June 8, 1887, P. L. 822, a married woman's confession of judgment is presumably valid. It is no longer .necessary to state on the record the facts which before the act were necessary to the judgment’s validity.</p> <p>Formerly her capacity to contract was exceptional and her disability general; now her disability is exceptional and her capacity general; the burden is on her, when she seeks to avoid a contract, to bring it within one of the few exceptions.</p> <p>Practice, C. P. — Opening judgment — Judge sits as chancellor.</p> <p>The judge to whom an application to open a judgment is made acts as a chancellor; it is his duty to weigh the testimony; and he is not required in every case of conflicting evidence to send the case to the jury; and upon appeal the appellate court will only see that his discretion has been properly exercised.</p> <p>Married women — Liability on an obligation — Burden of proof.</p> <p>One who presents a money obligation of a married woman since the act of 1887 has made out a prima facie case which can only be defeated by showing that the contract is one of the kinds prohibited by the act. The presumption even in the case of a judgment is that it is regular and valid. The fact that a husband and wife signed a judgment note does not raise the presumption that the wife signed as a surety; and the allegation of the wife resting upon her unsupported testimony, which is opposed by the corroborated testimony of the plaintiff, that she did sign as surety, is not sufflcient to compel a chancellor to open a judgment against her.</p>