Steele v. Gellatly

Citations

• 41 Ill. 39

Syllabus

<p>1. Dower—limitation act of 1839. It was held in Owen v. Peacock, 38 111 33, that where the statute of limitations of 1839 had run against a widow, after she had become discovert, and counting the seven years from the time her right of action for her dower had accrued, the statute could be set up as a bar.</p> <p>2. But the statute does not commence to run against the right of dower until a right of action therefor has accrued to the claimant, which cannot be until she becomes discovert. During the life-time of the husband, the wife has an inchoate right, of, dower, hut this inchoate right cannot be asserted against an adverse possession until it has become consummate by the death of the husband.</p> <p>3. The act is one of limitation, and, like all other acts of limitation, is not to take effect until the period of limitation has run, and is not to be construed as having commenced to run as against any claim or estate until such claim or estate can be lawfully asserted in the courts.</p> <p>4. Same—laches of the husband. Nor can the widow’s right of dower be affected by the laches of the husband in permitting an adverse possession to exist during a period of seven years in his life-time, for the law protects the right of dower against the acts or laches of the husband.</p> <p>5. Ldhtatiost act ot 1839—its constitutionality. The constitutionality of the act of 1889, as a limitation law, is re-affirmed in this case.</p>