Steck v. City of Allegheny

Citations

• 213 Pa. 573
• 62 A. 1115
• 1906 Pa. LEXIS 535

Syllabus

<p>Negligence — Contributory negligence — Streets—Ice on footwalh — Knowledge of defect — Province of court and fury.</p> <p>In an action against a municipality to recover for personal injuries it appeared that plaintiff while going the usual and direct route to his work about noon stepped on ice, fell and was injured. The street was unpaved, with a cinder sidewalk on each side about five feet in width. At the point of the accident there was a depression or hole in the sidewalk, in which ice had accumulated, five or six feet in length, two inches deep and fifteen to eighteen inches wide. The ground was covered with an inch of snow which had fallen during the morning. Plaintiff and other persons had constantly used the walk and but one person had fallen. At the time of the accident plaintiff was walking carefully. Held, that the plaintiff was net as a matter of law guilty of contributory negligence but that the question was for the jury.</p> <p>Where in a suit for damages for injuries received by falling on an accumulation of ice on a sidewalk it appears that all streets were icy and slippery at the time of the accident and that the roadway was in a condition which might render it dangerous, the question as to whether there was a safer route which the plaintiff could have taken is for the jury.</p> <p>If one is injured in the use of a street known by him to be defective, and the evidence shows that when he entered upon it the danger was imminent and immediate, the court as a matter of law may declare him guilty of negligence, but when the testimony shows a defect of such character that the street can be used with safety by the exercise of reasonable care, notwithstanding its defective condition, whether the injured person performed the duty required of him under the circumstances is a question for the jury.</p> <p>A person is not guilty of contributory negligence in using a-road known by him to be defective unless the danger is so apparent that in the use of ordinary