State v. Young

Citations

• 30 S.C. 399
• 9 S.E. 355
• 1889 S.C. LEXIS 117

Syllabus

<p>1. Under the old criminal practice, an objection that the indictment charged no criminal offence should have been taken only by demurrer ; but under the act of 1887 (19 Stat., 829), this objection may be taken by demurrer or by motion to quash.</p> <p>2. An order quashing an indictment is in effect a final judgment, and from such an order the State may appeal.</p> <p>3. The right to erect a wharf and charge for its use below high tide mark on a navigable stream is a franchise, which can only be obtained from the State, and any one doing so without authority is guilty of a public nuisance.</p> <p>4. It is a matter of doubt whether any particular act is repealed by the General Statutes of 1872, by its incorporation into the schedule of acts which ‘‘have expired, or have been, or are hereby, expressly repealed.”</p> <p>5. An act of 1768, in its first section regulated wharf charges at the port of Charleston. An act of 1778, entitled an act to amend this act of 1768, made other wharfage rates, and repealed said first section. An act of 1807, entitled an act to amend this act of 1778, made a schedule of wharfage rates, and repealed so much of the act of 1778 and other acts as were repugnant thereto. The General Statutes of 1872 expressly repealed the acts of 1768 and 1778', but not the act of 1807 ; and declared all navigable streams to be public highways and free to all, and any obstruction thereof to be a nuisance. Held, that the act of 1807 was not repealed by implication.</p> <p>6. The act of 1807 was affirmative and original, and was not repealed by the repeal of the act of 1778, oven though in its title declared to be an amendment of that act (1778), and it is still of force.</p>