State ex rel. Gentry v. Mayor of Village of Dodson

Citations

• 123 La. 903
• 49 So. 635
• 1909 La. LEXIS 800

Syllabus

<p>1. Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>Section 15 of Act No. 136, p. 228, of 1898, reads as follows: “The mayor and board of aldermen of every city, town and village shall have the care, management and control of the city, town or village and its property and finances, and shall have power to enact ordinances for the purposes hereinafter named and such as are not repugnant to the laws of the state and such ordinances to alter, modify and repeal and they shall, have power to provide for the election of such municipal officers other than those required by this act as may be found necessary, to prescribe the duties and to fix the compensation of all officers and employés, and to require bonds with sureties for the performance of duties from all officers and employés.”</p> <p>2. Constitutional Law (§ 63*) — Municipal Corporations (§ 63*) — Delegation of Power to Municipality — Review by Courts.</p> <p>The plaintiff, alleging that he was prevented from performing the duties and enjoying the emoluments of the office of marshal of the village of Dodson by the wrongful, illegal, fraudulent, malicious acts of the mayor and board of aldermen of that village in fixing by ordinance his bond at the unreasonable and outrageous sum of $3,000, and the salary of the marshal at the small, ridiculous, unreasonable, and unjust sum of $1 per month, prayed the district court to declare the ordinance null and void because illegal and unreasonable, and that they be compelled, by mandamus, to fix a reasonable bond and reasonable compensation. The district court made the writ peremptory and ordered the defendant to fix the bond in a sum not exceeding $1,000 and the marshal’s compensation at a sum not less than $50 per month.</p> <p>The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal, but on appeal the judgment was affirmed. The judgment has been brought before us for review under a writ of certiorari or writ of review. That judgment and the judgment of the district court are reversed, and plaintiff’s