Sheldrake v. Rumpf

Citations

• 68 Pa. Super. 546
• 1917 Pa. Super. LEXIS 169

Syllabus

<p>Malicious prosecution — Principal and agent — Authority of agent —Probable cause — Malice.</p> <p>A principal may be held liable for the act of his agent in instituting a malicious prosecution; but the act of the agent becomes that of the principal only where expressly authorized, or where his authority to act may be fairly inferred from the nature and scope of his employment.</p> <p>Where in an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff’s own evidence .shows probable cause, offers of evidence made in support of the allegation of malice are properly rejected as immaterial, and the burden of proof in such a case is on the plaintiff both as to malice and want of probable cause.</p> <p>What is probable cause, and whether it existed under an admitted and clearly established statement of facts is a question of law for the court.</p> <p>In an action for malicious prosecution, a nonsuit is properly entered, where it appears, that the plaintiffs were arrested after they had defied the direction of the defendant’s agent to vacate premises which had been regularly delivered to him by the sheriff and after they had been given a reasonable time to withdraw peaceably.</p>