Seeligson v. Lewis & Williams

Citations

• 65 Tex. 215
• 1885 Tex. LEXIS 338

Syllabus

<p>1. Contracts—Futures—A contract for the sale of goods to be delivered at a future day is valid, even though the seller has not the gooods nor any other means of getting them than to go into the market and buy them; but such a contract is valid only when the parties really intend and agree that the goods are to be delivered by the seller and the price is to be paid by the buyer.</p> <p>2. Same—Wagers—Public policy—If, under the guise of such a contract, the real intent of the parties be merely to speculate in the rise or fall of prices, and the goods are not to be delivered,but one party is to pay to the other the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods at the date fixed for executing the contract, then the whole transaction constitutes nothing more than a wager, is contrary to public policy and is void.</p> <p>3. Same—Pleading—See opinion in this case for a plea held to allege matters such as, if true, would constitute a contract made for the sale of a commodity to be delivered at a future day, a mere wager or gambling contract.</p> <p>4. Same—Brokers—When a broker is privy to the unlawful design of the parties to an illegal contract and becomes an actor through whom the thing is to be done, and contracts to perform the acts necessary to its achievement, he is particeps criminis and' cannot recover for services rendered or money paid by him on behalf of either in furthering the transaction.</p> <p>5. Same—Advances—Consideration—If the course of business be such that the broker is expected to make advances of money, then his employment is a request to him to do what the course of business requires, and the liability to repay him will depend, not upon whether the promise to pay was made before or after the transaction in which the advances were made, but on whether that transaction was legal or illegal. The law implies a promise to pay when one person, at the request of another, discharges for the latter a legal obligation to a third