Scranton v. Jermyn

Citations

• 156 Pa. 107
• 27 A. 66
• 1893 Pa. LEXIS 1318

Syllabus

<p>Municipalities — Paving—Act of May 23, 1889.</p> <p>Under the act of May 23,1889, art. 5, § 3, clause 10, and art. 15, § 26, relating to the paving of streets upon a petition of a majority of owners, if the record oí a suit on a claim for paving shows that a petition was presented and an ordinance passed, the ordinance is conclusive of the fact that a majority of owners had joined in the petition. In such case an affidavit of defence, averring that the petition was not signed by a majority of owners, is insufficient.</p> <p>Notice of ordinance by advertising — Paving—Evidence.</p> <p>The provision of arc. 15, § 22, of the act of May 23,1889, which provides that paving claims “ shall be prima facie evidence of the amount thereof, and of the same being due and owing, and of all matters therein set forth,” extends to the provision of the act requiring that no ordinance for paving shall be passed until five days notice shall be given by advertisement. Where a claim for paving recites the fact that the ordinance was passed as required by law, an affidavit of defence, which does not aver that no five days notice by advertisement was given, is insufficient.</p> <p>Municipal claims — Taxation—Defences.</p> <p>Municipal claims for paving and other public improvements are a species of taxation, and the property owner has only such rights of contest and defence as the legislature chooses to allow him.</p> <p>Municipal contract for paving — Affidavit of defence.</p> <p>Where a municipality enters into a contract for paving, but limits its liability to the contractor to the amount of the claim recovered against the property owners, averments in an affidavit of defence, in a suit by the city for paving, that no provision had been made by councils for the indebtedness, and that the contract had been awarded by resolution and not by ordinance, are irrelevant and immaterial.</p>