Ronan v. 155,453 Feet of Lumber

Citations

• 131 F. 345
• 1904 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197

Syllabus

<p>1. Shipping — Lighterage oe Cargo — Demurrage.</p> <p>A steamship line contracted to carry a cargo of lumber to New York, and deliver it at any point directed, within the lighterage limits of the port The owner directed a part of it delivered to a shipyard on Staten Island, which was outside the limits; and the carrier employed libelant’s barge to make such delivery, charging the owner of the lumber with the cost of the extra towage. The barge, with all the lumber loaded thereon, was unable to get up to the dock at which lumber was delivered at the shipyard, and, the consignee declining to receive it elsewhere, she lay several days waiting until a part was taken off onto another boat. Both the steamship company and libelant knew the condition of the dock, and that the barge would certainly, or at least probably, be unable to reach it with the load placed on her, and it was verbally agreed between them that the company should not be liable for demurrage. Held, that the delay was due to the action of the steamship company and libelant in knowingly placing such a load on the barge that she probably could not reach the dock, and they could not cast the burden of their negligence on either the skipper or the consignee, and that libelant could not recover the demur-rage from the steamship company, because of their agreement.</p> <p>¶ 1. Demurrage, see notes to Harrison v. Smith, 14 C. C. A. 657; Randall v. Sprague, 21 C. C. A. 337; Hagerman v. Norton, 46 C. C. A. 4.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>A memorandum or writing delivered by the steamship company to the master of the barge after the lumber had been loaded thereon, apparently to be signed by the consignee and returned as a receipt, and which contained incomplete provisions with respect to demurrage for delay after the barge was “ready to deliver,” but was not signed by either the steamship company or libelant, would not exclude proof of the parol agreement between them in that respect; nor could libelant claim that the