Rippetoe v. Dwyer

Citations

• 65 Tex. 703
• 1886 Tex. LEXIS 731

Syllabus

<p>1. Lis pendens—Notice—That lis pendens operates as notice, is true in all cases to which the rule is applicable; but the rule, which is necessarily arbitrary, has its foundation in a public policy which will not permit parties litigant to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute, to the prejudice of the opposite party, and the rule ought not to be given effect when the reasons which give it existence do not require its enforcement.</p> <p>2. Same—Suit collusively prosecuted—An action eollusively prosecuted, when all the parties to it know that there is no right to be enforced, does not operate as lis pendens, for the reason that no prejudice can result to the right of any one by not regarding it. (Citing Sugden on Vendors, 534; and Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. 571.)</p> <p>8. Tenants in common—Incumbrances—Notice—If a purchase of property be made by two or more persons jointly, or as tenants in common, one of them will not be charged with notice of an incumbrance or conveyance affecting the title, known only to the other, unless the one having such knowledge has, by virtue of partnership relations, or some other means, been made the agent of the other. He who has notice of the incumbrance or conveyance will hold his title in subordination thereto, but he who has not such notice will obtain his title free from the claim to which his co-tenant is subjected. (Citing Freeman on Co-ten., 171; Parker v. Kane, 21 Wis. 27; Wiswall v. McGown, 2 Barb. 281; Snyder v. Sponsable, 1 Hill, 570.)</p> <p>4. Charge of court—Notice—See opinion in this case for a charge on the question of notice, held to be erroneous.</p> <p>5. Case distinguished—The case of Littleton v. Giddings, 47 Tex. 117, distinguished.</p>