Quivey v. Hall & Huggins

Citations

• 19 Cal. 97

Syllabus

<p>Judgment was obtained against C. in December, 1850; ho died in February, 1852; letters of administration on his estate in December, 1856; this judgment presented to the administrators as a claim against the estate in February, 1859; claim rejected, and this suit brought in March following to compel its allowance: Held, that the claim is not barred by the Statute of Limitations of five years applicable to judgments; that the right of action on the judgment ceased under our statute upon the death of the debtor; that presentation of the claim to the administrator is substituted in place of suit; and that the right to sue comes, not from the existence of the debt and nonpayment, but from the refusal to allow it as a claim against the estate, and hence does not accrue until presentation of the claim, which need not be made until after publication of notice to creditors.</p> <p>By common law, when the Statute of Limitations begins to run, a subsequent disability, as death of the party bound, etc., does not stop it. But this doctrine has no application where judgment is obtained against an intestate in his lifetime and no execution levied. In such case, the judgment creditor being prevented by the statute from suing after the death of the debtor, the statute ceases to run until presentation of the claim to the administrator.</p> <p>Where suit is brought against an administrator on a judgment obtained against his intestate in his lifetime, which the administrator refused to allow, and judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff, interest must not be compounded. This latter judgment amounts to nothing more than a recognition of the former as a claim against the estate, and interest should be computed according to the rate fixed therein.</p>