Pritchard v. Wenger

Citations

• 268 Pa. 114
• 110 A. 726
• 1920 Pa. LEXIS 636

Syllabus

<p>Libel — Writing not libellous per se — •Special darhages not shown —Malice not shown — Privileged communication — Letter by secretary relating to conduct of president of corporation — Nonsuit.</p> <p>1. In an action for libel where the writing on which the suit is based, is not libellous per se, and no special damages are pleaded or proved, and no malice shown, a nonsuit is properly entered.</p> <p>2. Where the president of a corporation casts the deciding vote at a directors’ meeting in favor of a contract increasing his salary as manager, and thereafter draws the increase until he is dismissed as manager, a letter written by the secretary of the company to two directors in which he comments on the tenacity with which the president holds on to “the amount abstracted from the company,” but without making any charge of theft or embezzlement, is not libellous per se. The use of the word “abstract,” when read with its context, simply means obtained through the contract, the adoption of which the secretary attacked.</p> <p>3. Such a letter is a privileged communication, where it appears that it was written after the president had been ousted, and an attempt was being made to oust the secretary himself; and where it was written with an apparent full belief in the truth of the very general statements contained therein, by one immediately concerned with the subject-matter in hand, to others with a community of interest, for purposes of their common protection.</p>