People v. Estell

Citations

• 106 A.D. 516
• 19 N.Y. Crim. 496
• 94 N.Y.S. 748
• 1905 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2619

Syllabus

<p>Criminal trial — expression of an opinion by the judge — delay in disclosing the crime of rape —pi'oof of offenses subsequent to the one charged:</p> <p>What remarks made by the justice presiding at the trial of an indictment for rape in'the presence of the jury are not subject to the'criticism that the justice therein expressed an opinion .as'to the weight of the testimony, corisidéred. ' Reversible error cannot be predicated upon such remarks, even-though they are justly subject to criticism, unless they may have affected the result of the trial. ,</p> <p>Upon the trial of an indictment for rape, the fact that the complainant delayed, for a considerable length of time after the alleged outrage, making a disclosure thereof is a circumstance which may bo considered as bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. The force of this rule is, however, to be considered in connection with opportunity, fear, youth or other circumstances which the court or jury can see have operated to prevent an immediate disclosure.</p> <p>The fact that upon the trial of such indictment, the court admitted testimony of offenses subsequent to the one charged in the indictment, committed by the defendant upon the person of the complainant, does not constitute an error requiring the reversal of a judgment of conviction, where it appears that such testimony was brought out by the defendant upon the cross-examination of the complainant’s witness, and also that the question of tire admissibility of . the testimony was not raised upon the trial either by objection or otherwise:</p>