People ex rel. Woodruff v. Matson

Citations

• 129 Ill. 591

Syllabus

<p>1. Cbiminal law—delay in trial—right to discharge. Section 498 of the Criminal Code, providing for the discharge of prisoners confined after delay of two or more terms, when the delay is not attributable to the prisoners’ act, being intended to give effect to the clear constitutional right to a speedy trial, should receive a liberal construction.</p> <p>2. A person was indicted, with several others, upon the charge of murder, at the May term of the Criminal Court of Cook county, and was arrested May 29. At the next term—the June term of the same year—the cause was continued by the prosecution. At the July term the cause was continued by consent. At the August term the defendant specially referred to, on Ms own application, procured an order granting him a separate trial. He demanded a trial at the August term, but the cause was continued to the September term, and again to the October term. On petition for habeas corpus by the same defendant, for a discharge under the statute, it appeared that the trial of the other defendants was at that time pending, so that his trial could not be had until that of his co-defendants was concluded : Held, that the defendant at whose instance the order for a separate trial was granted, was not entitled to a discharge on account of the delay in his trial, as such delay, to an extent that would preclude him from availing of the statute, was occasioned by himself.</p> <p>3'. Cbiminal Coubt op Cook county—branches thereof treated as separate courts. Each branch of the Criminal Court of Cook county, so far as its jurisdiction to try a particular case is concerned, and to hear and to determine causes in which it is engaged, must be regarded as an independent court, separate and distinct from other branches of the court, as if it was in a separate jurisdiction.</p>