Pennsylvania Co. v. Rudel

Citations

• 100 Ill. 603
• 1881 Ill. LEXIS 151

Syllabus

<p>1. Continuance—for new counsel to prepane for trial. Where the defendant’s counsel, on the 16th day of the month, withdrew from the case, and on the same day other counsel were retained, who moved for a continuance to enable them to prepare for trial, which was refused, and the trial did not take place until the 23d of the same month, it was held, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion, calling for a reversal.</p> <p>2. Jubob—inquiry as to competency. A question to jurors asking them to state briefly their idea of the duties of a juror; with a view of ascertaining whether they were men of sound judgment and well informed, is not proper for that or any other purpose.</p> <p>3. Ebbob will not always bevebse—as to admission of evidence. A mere technical error in the admission of evidence of an unimportant character is no ground for reversal.</p> <p>4. Pleading and evidence. Evidence of what a flagman of a railroad company said and did at the time and just before a person about to take passage on a train was struck by another train passing on another track at a rapid speed, is pertinent in an action to recover for the injury, under an allegation that the company failed to keep a flagman at the spot to signal and warn of the approach of impending danger. Such allegation means more than that there was no flagman employed there.</p> <p>5. Instbuctions—one given by the court of its own motion may supersede others ashed. Where the court gives an instruction of its own in place of others refused, which fairly states the law of the case, the party asking those refused will have no cause of complaint.</p> <p>6. Negligence—instruction as to negligence of the plaintiff. Under peculiar circumstances going to excuse the plaintiff from taking the usually necessary precautions to avoid danger, an instruction in a suit to recover for a personal injury from a passing train at the intersection of the track with a street crossing, that if the plaintiff knew of the exis