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· 9/2/1889

Pennie v. Reis

Citations

  • 80 Cal. 266
  • 22 P. 176
  • 1889 Cal. LEXIS 901

Syllabus

<p>San Francisco — Police Lire and Health Insurance Fund—Repeal or Statute—Merger op Fund — Constitutional Law. —The act of April 1, 1878, creating a police life and health insurance fund out of part of the monthly salaries of police-officers in the city and county of San Francisco, was repealed by the act of March 4, 1889, creating a police relief, health, and life insurance and pension fund, and merging the former fund in the latter, and such repeal and merger was constitutional and valid as against the legal representatives of a member of the police force whose salary was in part detained under the former act, ■ but who did not die until after the passage of the latter act.</p> <p>Id.—Due Process os Law—Vested Rights — Salary or Orpioeb.— Such repeal and merger did not deprive the police-officer of any property without due process of law, or impair any vested right. A public officer whose term and compensation are not fixed by the constitution has no contract by which he can hold his office or salary against the legislative will, and a repealing statute destroying a mere expectancy under a former statute, depending upon the contingency of the death of such officer, does not affect a vested right, if the death does not occur before the statute is repealed.</p> <p>Id. — Repeal op Statute by Implication. — A repeal of a former statute by necessary implication takes place whenever it becomes apparent by subsequent legislation that the legislature does not intend the former act to remain in force, or the acts are so inconsistent that both cannot stand together.</p> <p>Id.— Title op Act — Special Commission—Extra Compensation to Public Ofpicer.—The act of March 4, 1889, is sufficient as to its title; does not create “a special commission ” within the prohibition of section 13 of article 11 of the state constitution; nor does it grant an extra compensation to any public officer, or make to him any gift of public money; but is in all respects valid and effective.</p>

How courts have described this case

Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.

  • holding that an application was required to seek review of an administrative zoning decision under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) even though appellant filed a new action below, rather than appealing the zoning decision to the superior court
  • discretionary application required where case commenced as mandamus/declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate administrative zoning decision
  • discretionary application required where case commenced as mandamus/declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate administrative zoning decision
  • discretionary application required where case commenced as mandamus/declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate zoning

Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).

Judges: McFarland

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