Parrish v. Rosebud Mining & Milling Co.

Citations

• 7 Cal. Unrep. 117
• 71 P. 694
• 1903 Cal. LEXIS 945

Syllabus

<p>Fire Insurance—Insertion of False Answers by Agent.—Where an insurance company’s agent inserted false answers in an application for a fire policy after full information as to the facts had been given him by insured’s manager, such answers constituted no defense to an action on the policy though the answers were declared to constitute warranties.</p> <p>Fire Insurance—Insertion of False Answers by Agent.—The falsity of such answers constituted a valid defense to a policy issued by another company, not represented by such agent, on the same property, based on such application.</p> <p>Fire Insurance—Payment Dtiring Litigation—Bond for Repayment.—Where, pending a controversy as to the liability of several insurance companies for a loss, the L. Co. paid insured ninety-five per cent of the face of its policy, and took from insured a bond for repayment in case a judgment should be rendered adverse to insured in any of the actions contemplated against the other insurance companies, such bond was a guaranty, and not a contract of suretyship, and no recovery could be had thereon if the principal obligation was void for any cause other than the personal disability of the principal obligor.1</p> <p>Fire Insurance—Payment During Litigation—Bond for Bepayment.—Pending a controversy as to the liability of insurers for a olss, one of them paid ninety-five per cent of its liability, and took a bond from insured, obligating it to repay such amount in the event that in any of the actions contemplated by insured against any of the other companies named, which had concurrent insurance on the property, a final judgment should be rendered in favor of the “defendant herein.” Held, that the word “herein” could not be stricken out, and the word “therein” substituted, since the term “defendant herein” was not improperly applied to the obligee as being defendant in one of the cases enumerated, or as expressing an intention that the “adverse judgment” should be on grounds favorable to such o