Panama Railroad v. Johnson

How courts have described this case

Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.

• holding that incorporation by reference of one statute or system of statutes “serves to bring into the latter all that is fairly covered by the statute”
• holding that the Jones Act “does not encroach on the admiralty jurisdiction intended by the Constitution, but permits that jurisdiction to be invoked and exercised as it has been from the beginning”
• noting that although “the principles of the general maritime law, sometimes called the law of the sea,” were “embodied” in Art. Ill, § 2, of the Constitution, they remained “subject to power in Congress to alter, qualify or supplement”
• declining to find a “pronounced departure” from prior law absent “terms unmistakeably manifesting” such intent from Congress
• observing that “a generic reference” to an existing statute “is a recognized mode of incorporating one statute or system of statutes into another, and serves to bring into the latter all that is fairly covered by the reference”
• observing that “reference” to another statute “is a recognized mode of incorporating one statute or system of statutes into another, and serves to bring into the latter all that is fairly covered by the reference.” (citing Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838))

Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).