Palmer v. Laberee

Citations

• 23 Wash. 409
• 63 P. 216
• 1900 Wash. LEXIS 371

Syllabus

<p>JUDGMENTS-REVIVAL-CONSTITUTIONALITY OE STATUTE.</p> <p>It being apparent that the legislative intent in enacting the statute of March 6, 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 52) “relating to the duration of judgments and repealing §§ 462 and 463, volume 2, Hill’s Code of Washington,” was to deprive a judgment creditor of all remedy — either common law or statutory — in the 'matter of revival of judgments, and all the provisions of the act being connected together as a uniform piece of legislation on that one subject, the act must be construed as void in toto, as to existing .judgment creditors, when one section thereof has been declared unconstitutional in so far as that class of creditors is concerned.</p> <p>•SAME.</p> <p>Conceding that § 1 of the act of March 6, 1897, which provides that “After the expiration of six years from the rendition of any judgment it shall cease to be a lien or charge against the estate or person of the judgment debtor,” is not open to objection on the same ground as the balance of the statute, because it deals with the judgment itself and not with the remedy to enforce its obligation, the section must be held unconstitutional on the ground that it destroys the obligation of existing contracts and amounts to legislative confiscation; and hence, where an action for revival of an existing judgment was brought within six years from date of rendition, no limitation is imposed upon the right to introduce the judgment in evidence, where the trial does not occur until the lapse of a greater period than six years after its rendition.</p> <p>INTEREST — RATE ON JUDGMENTS — EFFECT OF CHANGE OF LAW.</p> <p>Where a promissory note was executed drawing interest at the rate of one per cent, per month, without any provision therein for interest after maturity, and such note has been placed in judgment, without any recital as to the amount of interest it should draw, the judgment would draw interest at the legal rate specified by statute, and this rate would vary from