Nichols v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co.

Citations

• 195 F. 913
• 115 C.C.A. 601
• 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1443

Syllabus

<p>1. Removal of Causes (§ 108*)—Jurisdiction—Discontinuance.</p> <p>Where a federal court acquired uo jurisdiction of a cause by the filing of the record therein after a petition for removal had been denied by the state court, because of the insufficiency-of the petition to warrant a removal. the filing of a discontinuance by the plaintiff in the federal court, after a motion to remand had been overruled, was ineffective to dismiss the action which remained pending in the state court.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Removal of Causes, Cent. Dig. § 217; Dec. Dig. § 108.*J</p> <p>2. Removal of Causes (§ 50*)—Separable Controversy—Petition Alleging Different Causes of Action.</p> <p>Where the petition in a state court in an action against a railroad company and auother for a personal injury set up -two causes of action, one against both defendants for joint negligence and the other against the railroad company alone for failure to comply with a statute, there was a separable controversy presented which rendered the cause removable by the railroad company, which was a citizen of a different state from plaintiff or its codefendant.</p> <p>[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Removal of Causes, Cent. Dig. § 100; Dec. Dig. § 50.*</p> <p>Separable controversy as ground for removal of cause to federal court, see notes to Robbins v. Ellenbogen, 18 C. C. A. 86; Mecke v. Yalleytown Mineral Co., 35 C. C. A. 155: Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co., 100 C. C. A. 4.]</p> <p>8. Limitation' of Actions (§ 34*)—What Law Governs—Action Based on Safety Appliance Act—Liability Created by Statute.</p> <p>An action against a railroad company to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the violation by defendant of Safety Appliance Act (Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174J), is one “upon a liability created by statute” within the meaning of Ky. St. § 2515, limiting the time for bringing such actions to five years, and, in absence of any federal