Naylor v. City of Galesburg

Citations

• 56 Ill. 285

Syllabus

<p>1. Repeal oe ordinances—repugnance. A city had adopted the following ordinances respecting the sale of liquor:</p> <p>“ Whoever shall, by himself, his clerk, agent or servant, sell any alcoholic or intoxicating drink whatever, or any intoxicating liquor, in any quantity, or shall deliver or give away the same, to be drank or used as a beverage, shall be subject to a penalty of not less than fifty dollars.</p> <p>“ The sale, barter, exchange or giving away of all intoxicating drinks or liquors is prohibited, except by licensed druggists, and only allowed by them for sacramental, mechanical, medicinal, chemical purposes, and for a second or subsequent convictions under this division, the party offending shall be subject to a penalty of not less than seventy-five dollars.”</p> <p>After which the following:</p> <p>“ Whoever, except a licensed druggist, shall, by himself, his clerk, agent or servant, sell any alcoholic or intoxicating drink whatever, or any intoxicating liquor, in any quantity, or in any house, room or place where such liquors are kept, stored or delivered, give away the same to any person for use as a beverage, shall be subject to a penalty of not less than fifty dollars.” Held, there was such a repugnance between them that the last ordinance must operate to repeal the former.</p> <p>2. Same—effect of repeal upon pending proceedings. The repeal of an ordinance of a town or city which prescribes a penalty for its violation, pending a prosecution under such ordinance, will operate to put an end to such prosecution, unless saved by a clause in the repealing ordinance.</p> <p>3. Same—construction of the act of 1859. This rule of the common law prevails as to ordinances of a town, notwithstanding the statute of 1859 in relation to the repeal of laws by implication. That act applies solely to statutes enacted by the legislature, and not to the laws or ordinances of a corporation.</p>