Mulderig v. Wilkes-Barre Times

Citations

• 215 Pa. 470
• 64 A. 636
• 1906 Pa. LEXIS 825

Syllabus

<p>Libel — Malice—Privileged communication — Criticism of public official.</p> <p>Criticism of the official conduct of a public officer is always a proper subject for public discussion and information, and as such is privileged. If there is that in the publication which furnishes a basis for reasonable inference that malice was back of it, the burden remains with the party-charged to establish either its truth or the probable ground for believing it true. When such is not the case there must be some evidence beyond the mere fact of publication; but there is no requirement as to what the form of evidence shall be. It may be intrinsic, from the style and tone of the article.</p> <p>In an action for libel the publication charged the plaintiff with misconduct, in his office as a civil magistrate, so gross and flagrant as to demand, in the opinion expressed editorially, his impeachment and a full investigation into his past record, which it was declared might possibly develop other charges for securing his ignominious discharge. It characterized him as a “sycophantic Justice,” and in unmistakable language accused him of being party to a conspiracy to humiliate, by sending to jail overnight, a person charged before him with misdemeanor. “Never in coercion days in Ireland,” the article said, “was there a more wicked conspiracy to deprive men of their right to their spoken opinion, and to railroad them to prison for daring to stand up in defense of those rights. This man M. has certainly mistaken his vocation, and has not realized that he is living in the land of the free.” Held, that the case was for the jury, and that it was error to direct a nonsuit.</p>