Morrison v. Norman

Citations

• 47 Ill. 477

Syllabus

<p>1. Color of title—a deed regular on its face is color of title. It is the settled rule of this court that a deed regular on its face is good color of title, under the statute, and that bad faith will not be presumed of the grantee, in the absence of proof.</p> <p>2. So where lands are sold to pay taxes, and a deed is made at the proper time, and is regular on its face, the grantee claiming only color of title under it, the presumption is, that the notice required by the constitution was properly given.</p> <p>3. But if facts are adduced sufficient to overcome this presumption of regularity, while the title remains in the original grantee, and he then fails to establish the fact of giving the required notice—semble, that this breach of duty ■would amount to bad faith, and defeat his claim under the statute.</p> <p>4. Former decisions. The doctrine that the claimant, under a tax title, must show that he gave the notice prescribed by the constitution, as laid down by this court in Holbrook v. Fellows, 38 Ill. 440, has reference to cases where a paramount title is claimed under such deed, and not to cases where such deed is merely color of title, under the statute of limitations.</p> <p>5. Statute of limitations-—when it commences to run. The seven years’ bar under the statute, commences to run from the first payment of taxes after the execution of the deed, though the taxes, in fact, were due before that time.</p> <p>6. Tax receipt—misdescription in. A tax- receipt which erroneously states the, number of acres in a tract of land, but describes a legal subdivision, is good, and the statement of the quantity is immaterial.</p> <p>7. Married woman's separate property act—effect of on statute of limitations. The provisions of the law of 1861, known as the married woman’s separate property act, does not so far remove the disabilities of coverture as to take married women out of the saving clause of the statute of limitations.</p>