Miranda v. Arizona

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1966 U.S. Supreme Court case establishing the use of the Miranda warning

1966 United States Supreme Court case

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that law enforcement must warn a person of their constitutional rights before interrogating them when they are in custody, or else the person's statements cannot be used as evidence against them at their trial . Specifically, the Court held that under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution , the government cannot use a person's statements made in response to an interrogation while in police custody as evidence at the person's criminal trial unless they can show that the person was informed of the right to consult with a lawyer before and during questioning, and of the right against self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights but also voluntarily waived them before answering questions.

Miranda was viewed by many as a radical change in American criminal law, because the Due Process Clause was traditionally understood to protect Americans only from certain forms of formal coercion, such as threats of contempt of court .[1] It transformed law enforcement in the United States by making what became known as the "Miranda warning " part of routine police procedure to ensure that suspects were informed of their rights, which came to be known as "Miranda rights". The Miranda warning concept quickly caught on across American law enforcement agencies, who came to call the practice "Mirandizing".

Pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court decision _Berghuis v. Thompkins _ (2010), a suspect must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent or to counsel. If the suspect receives and understands the Miranda warnings and then voluntarily makes statements, those statements may be treated as establishing an implied waiver of those rights.

Background

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Legal

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In 1951 Legal Aid in the United States, a report in the Survey of the Legal Profession series, was published by the American Bar Association . It identified large gaps in the availability of legal services in both civil and criminal cases for those unable to afford a lawyer. By the early 1960s, in response to the report, efforts by various bar associations to expand legal aid for defendants had resulted in a substantial increase in services, although still with large areas of the country underserved.[2]

In the civil realm, it led to the creation of the Legal Services Corporation under the Great Society program of Lyndon B. Johnson . _Escobedo v. Illinois _, a case which closely foreshadowed Miranda, provided for the presence of counsel during police interrogation.

Factual

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On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested by the Phoenix Police Department officers Carroll Cooley and Wilfred Young, based on circumstantial evidence linking him to the kidnapping and rape of an 18-year-old woman 10 days earlier.[3] After two hours of interrogation by police officers, Miranda signed a confession to the rape charge on forms that included the typed statement: "I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my own free will, with no threats, coercion, or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me."[4]

However, at no time was Miranda told of his right to counsel. Before being presented with the form on which he was asked to write out the confession that he had already given orally, he was not advised of his right to remain silent, nor was he informed that his statements during the interrogation would be used against him. At trial, when prosecutors offered Miranda's written confession as evidence, his court-appointed lawyer , Alvin Moore, objected that because of these facts, the confession was not truly voluntary and should be excluded. Moore's objection was overruled, and based on this confession and other evidence, Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping. He was sentenced to 20–30 years of imprisonment on each charge, with sentences to run concurrently. Moore filed Miranda's appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court , claiming that Miranda's confession was not fully voluntary and should not have been admitted into the court proceedings. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the confession in State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965). In affirmation, the Arizona Supreme Court heavily emphasized the fact that Miranda did not specifically request an attorney.[5]

Attorney John Paul Frank , former law clerk to Justice Hugo Black , represented Miranda in his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.[6] Gary K. Nelson represented Arizona.

Supreme Court decision

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On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court issued a 5–4 decision in Miranda's favor that overturned his conviction and remanded his case back to Arizona for retrial.

Opinion of the Court

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Chief Justice Earl Warren , the author of the majority opinion in Miranda

Five justices formed the majority and joined an opinion written by Chief Justice Earl Warren .[7] The Court ruled that because of the coercive nature of the custodial interrogation by police, no confession could be admissible under the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause and Sixth Amendment right to an attorney unless a suspect has been made aware of his rights and the suspect has then waived them:

The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.[8]

Thus, Miranda's conviction was overturned. The Court also made clear what must happen if a suspect chooses to exercise their rights:

If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease ... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.

Justice Brennan's comments on the Miranda decision.

Warren also pointed to the existing procedures of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which required informing a suspect of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, provided free of charge if the suspect was unable to pay. If the suspect requested counsel, "the interview is terminated." Warren included the FBI's four-page brief in his opinion.[9]

Clark's concurrence in part, dissent in part

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In a separate concurrence in part, dissent in part, Justice Tom C. Clark argued that the Warren Court went "too far too fast." Instead, Justice Clark would use the "[totality of the circumstances](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Totality_of_the_circumstances "Totality of

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