Miller v. Newell

Citations

• 20 S.C. 123
• 1883 S.C. LEXIS 133

Syllabus

<p>1. The Court of Equity could not decree specific performance of an agreement between the plaintiff in a slander case and his attorneys, that he would pay to them a part of his recovery out of the verdict when obtained, or a portion of the verdict itself.</p> <p>2. If, in such case, the verdict, when obtained, was satisfied through collusion between plaintiff and defendant to the injury of plaintiff’s attorneys, the court would not order the satisfaction to be vacated, as specific performance of such agreement between plaintiff and his attorneys could not be decreed.</p> <p>8. A proceeding by rule, on the motion of plaintiff’s attorneys, to require the defendant in such slander case to show cause why a satisfaction of the verdict should not be vacated, is in the nature of a bill for specific performance and cannot be entertained.</p> <p>4. The attorneys, as creditors of the plaintiff, could not proceed against the defendant for an alleged fraud in the satisfaction, until they had exhausted their legal remedies against their debtor.</p> <p>5. A chose in action arising out of tort strictly personal, as slander, is not assignable. After verdict in slander, but before judgment entered thereon and while appeal is pending, the claim for damages continues to be a chose in action.</p> <p>6. An assignment may be made by parol, but doubted whether the mere declaration “I do assign,” in the absence of the subject-matter, constitutes an assignment.</p> <p>7. The facts and circumstances of this case did not give defendant knowledge of the plaintiff’s intended fraud upon his attorneys, nor were they sufficient notice to put defendant upon the inquiry. The findings of fact by the Circuit judge on the return to the rule, not concurred in. McGowan, A. J.,</p>