McLaughlin v. Fisher

Citations

• 136 Ill. 111
• 24 N.E. 60

Syllabus

<p>1. Slander—of the declaration—office of the innuendo—inducement— colloquium. In an action for speaking slanderous words of and concerning the plaintiff, it is not permissible to enlarge and extend the meaning of the words spoken, beyond their natural import, by the innuendo, except so far as such enlarged meaning is warranted by prefatory matter set forth in the inducement or colloquium.</p> <p>2. An innuendo is properly used to point the meaning of the words alleged to have been spoken, in view of the occasion and circumstances, whether appearing in the words themselves, or extraneous prefatory matters alleged in the declaration. It is explanatory of the subject matter sufficiently already stated, and it can not extend the natural meaning of the words unless there is something averred in the prefatory part of the declaration for it to explain, or to which it may properly extend them. Words not in themselves actionable can not be rendered so by an innuendo, without a prefatory averment of extrinsic facts which make them slanderous.</p> <p>3. The office of the inducement is to narrate the extrinsic circumstances which, coupled with the language published, affect its construction and render it actionable, when, standing alone and not thus explained, the language would appear not to concern the plaintiff, or, if concerning him, not to affect him injuriously.</p> <p>4. If, therefore, the words alleged to have been spoken are not slanderous per se, or if they do not refer to the plaintiff, or if they require explanation by some extrinsic matter to render them actionable, such extrinsic facts must be alleged by way of inducement, and thus render the charge intelligible and certain.</p> <p>5. The colloquium is to connect the words spoken, with the plaintiff, and with the extrinsic matters, if any, set forth by way of inducement.</p>