McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co.

Citations

• 261 Pa. 312
• 104 A. 617
• 1918 Pa. LEXIS 739

Syllabus

<p>Worhmen’s compensation law — Jurisdiction—Practice—Referee ■ — Board—Common Pleas — Appellate courts — Evidence—Hearsay—Circumstantial evidence — Sufficiency and competency-Presumption — Wool sorter — Scratch—Anthrax—Death—“Accident” — Occupational diseases — Assumption of rislcs — Appeals—Certiorari— Record — Act of June 2,1915, P. L. 786.</p> <p>1. A compensation referee is an officer of the Workrhen’s Compensation Board, vested with defined duties and powers, and all records made by him belong to the files of that body, and, on appeal, are before it for review, within the limitations of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736.</p> <p>2. The Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1915 contemplates and requires that, if, after inspection and consideration of the adjudication and evidence, the board does not' sustain the referee’s final .decision, before the former may reverse on a question of fact, it must grant a hearing de novo, make investigation, and substitute its own findings of fact, and conclusions thereon, for such findings of the referee as are not adopted; but, when an appeal is based on an alleged error of law, the board must act solely upon the record of the referee, and must either sustain, reverse or modify the latter’s final order.</p> <p>3. Appeals to the board are taken under either Section 420 or Section 421 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the first amounting to a writ of error and the second to a motion for a new trial, the new trial to be had before the board instead of the referee.</p> <p>4. A finding of fact without any evidence at all is an error of law.</p> <p>5. Where the ultimate finding of a referee is cast in the form of a mixed cpnelusion of fact and law, and the classification of an appeal is not made plain by the appellant, the board must exercise its discretion in determining the nature thereof.</p> <p>6. Where the attack upon the finding of a referee is upon the ground that the testimony was insufficient in fact to j