Martin v. Executors of Teague

Citations

• 29 S.C.L. 260

Syllabus

<p>1. Although undue influence, being a question of fact, belongs to the decision of the jury, yet the presiding Judge may also express his opinion upon the facts, avoiding all undue control of the jury. Such expression of his opinion, or his silence on that head, must be left to his own sound discretion. The circumstances of the case may render such aid necessary, or superfluous.</p> <p>2. Where the court perceives but very little in the evidence to shew that a testator’s mind was unsound, and even that opposed by good evidence, especially that of the subscribing witnesses, and a verdict has been rendered against the will, most probably upon this ground, upon unsatisfactory testimony of little more than bare opinions, a new trial will be ordered.</p> <p>3. It is the incidental privilege of courts of justice to reconsider, or to have reconsidered, their possible errors; and although from the constitution of juries being temporary, they cannot themselves reconsider, their privilege, like that of a Circuit Judge, being placed in other hands, yet still, it is no less their privilege on that account. ■</p> <p>4. It is at the foundation of all new trials by a jury, that they will probably render a different verdict. But they are always granted without prejudice to their rendering the same verdict.</p> <p>5. Where undue influence is the predicate of a verdict setting aside a will, it should be brought to bear against the true disposing mind of the testator in the matter and subject of his last will.</p> <p>6. It is not enough that there has been a general influence merely, which may or may not have been used fraudulently or unduly, and to which general influence so many men are habitually subject.</p> <p>7. The cases of Thompson vs. Farr, 1 Spears’s Rep. 93; Hobby vs. Bobo, M. S. Dec. vol. 54; Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 1 Bail. 92; and Lide vs. Lide, 2 Brev. 403, referred to as embracing the principles of this decision.</p>