Lumpkin v. Nutmeg State Financial Credit Union

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant credit union under article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (§ 42a-9-625) and the Retail Installment Sales Financing Act (RISFA) (§ 36a-785). The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, concluding that the plaintiff's claims for damages under §§ 42a-9-625 and 36a-785 were barred by the one year limitation period set forth in the statute of limitations (§ 52-585) governing actions \for any forfeiture upon any penal statute . . . .\ The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant. Held: The trial court having improperly applied the one year limitation period in § 52-585 to the plaintiff's claims under both article 9 of the UCC and RISFA, that court also improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. In so concluding, this court was guided by its decision in the companion case of Connex Credit Union v. Madgic (354 Conn. 459), in which the court concluded that, because §§ 42a-9-625 and 36a-785 are not penal statutes, the one year limitation period in § 52-585 is not applicable to claims brought under those statutes and that the three year limitation period set forth in the statute of limitations (§ 52-577) governing tort claims was the most suit- able limitation period for claims brought under §§ 42a-9-625 and 36a-785. Argued February 5—officially released April 28, 2026