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· 4/1/1907

Luckett Land & Emigration Co. v. Brown

Citations

  • 118 La. 943
  • 43 So. 628
  • 1907 La. LEXIS 828

Syllabus

<p>Brokers — Appointment — Acceptance — Sale oe Land — Right -to Commissions.</p> <p>Plaintiff sues defendant for commissions alleged to be due him as “selling agent” of a certain plantation. Defendant resists on the ground that the sending forward by himself of a power of attorney to plaintiff was a mere “offer” of an agency, and that before it was accepted he withdrew his lands from market; that in the power of attorney sent forward it was agreed and understood that no sale could or should be made until after the prospective buyer had a conference with him and had satisfied him as to his financial ability, and that he himself should be present at the sale and receive the cash and notes; that when the prospective buyer in this instance (with whom plaintiff, as agent, had entered into a written promise of sale of the land) presented himself at Natchez he did not put him (defendant) in default for nonexecution of the promise.</p> <p>Held, the defenses urged are not well founded. The sending forward of the power of attorney was not the initial step in the matter of the agency. It was an acceptance, in fact, of plaintiff’s offer to take the agency. If an acceptance was necessary, it was accepted by letter, and by action within the time that the situation of the parties and the nature of the contract showed it was the intention of the defendant to allow. Civ. Code, art. 1802. The notice of the withdrawal of the land from market was a recognition of the pre-existing agency of the plaintiffs. This withdrawal was after the plaintiff and the prospective buyer had started to meet defendant at Natchez. There was no necessity for putting defendant in default. He had himself put an end to the agency, and had placed it out of his power to carry out the promise of sale. He had withdrawn from the prospective purchaser an opportunity to show his good faith and ability to purchase. Civ. Code, art. 2040.</p> <p>TEd. Note. — For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 8, Brokers, §§ 5-8,

How courts have described this case

Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.

  • holding that the doctrine of consular non- reviewability did not bar review of plaintiffs’ claims that the government had failed to follow its own guidelines in adjudicating waiver applications
  • finding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Accardi claim in broader challenge to waiver program
  • finding jurisdiction to evaluate challenge to “systemic practices with respect to [a] program, and not individualized determination[] for any specific person”
  • highlighting plaintiffs’ express statements that they were not challenging individual consular decisions on the merits
  • “The allowance for waivers in the Proclamation was an important reason why the five-justice majority upheld it as serving a legitimate national security interest.”
  • review permissible in case challenging implementation of waiver process at consular posts

Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).

Judges: Nicholls

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