London & San Francisco Bank, Ltd. v. Dexter Horton & Co.

Citations

• 126 F. 593
• 61 C.C.A. 515
• 1903 U.S. App. LEXIS 4346

Syllabus

<p>1. Judgments — Persons Concluded — Effect of Lis Pendens.</p> <p>A judgment foreclosing a mortgage is effective as against one claiming title as a subsequent purchaser, although no lis pendens was filed, as required by the Washington statute (Ballinger’s Ann. Codes & St. § 4887), to give notice of the pendency of the suit, such statute having no application after judgment, which binds all parties subsequently dealing with the property affected thereby.</p> <p>2. Same — Decree of Foreclosure — Execution Purchaser.</p> <p>A judgment creditor who purchases property at a sale under his own judgment acquires only the interest of the debtor, and takes subject to a previous judgment of foreclosure against the property which was binding on the debtor.</p> <p>8. Same — Attaching Creditor.</p> <p>An attachment of land which is subject to a recorded mortgage, in an action against the mortgagor, creates a lien only on the equity of redemption, and the only effect of the failure of the mortgagee to make the attaching creditor a party to a subsequent foreclosure suit, or to charge him with notice by the filing of a lis pendens, in case the suit was previously instituted, is to leave him with the right of redemption in case he obtains judgment after the decree of foreclosure has been entered.</p> <p>4. Laches — Essentials of Bar — Prejudice of Opposing Party.</p> <p>To sustain the defense of laches, there must not only have been unnecessary delay on the part of the plaintiff in bringing or prosecuting his action, but also some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties occurring during the period of delay which would make it inequitable to permit the claim of the plaintiff to be enforced.</p> <p>5. Mortgages — Suit to Foreclose — Defense of Laches.</p> <p>A mortgagee does not lose the right to enforce the mortgage by laches because of delay in prosecuting a suit to foreclose, where the entire delay chargeable to the parties did not exceed six years, and it