Lesesne & Wells v. Young

Citations

• 33 S.C. 543
• 12 S.E. 414
• 1890 S.C. LEXIS 174

Syllabus

<p>1. A statute should be construed according to the true intention of the law-maker, and such intention must be ascertained, if possible, from the words used and in their ordinary and proper sense. Where the meaning of a word used is indicated by the terms of the act, there is no necessity to look for extraneous circumstances in aid of construction.</p> <p>2. An act to regulate the rates of wharfage and storage, passed in 1807, fixed the following rates and sums “and no greater * * for wharfage of ships or vessels, or for landing, weighing, and storing of the articles of rice and cotton upon the wharves in Charleston, to wit: * * * For landing every bale or ease of cotton, four cents per bale or case ; * s for shipping every bale or ease of cotton, four cents per bale or case.” Held, that the purpose of the act was to fix proper charges to be allowed the wharf owner for the use of his wharf in loading and unloading — for putting cotton on board ship to be transported, and taking cotton from a ship and putting it on the wharf. The word “landing'1 in this act did not include the deposit on the wharf of cotton from a lighter boat or dray; and changes in modes of transportation since 1807 cannot enlarge the meaning of this word.</p> <p>3. For cotton taken from a dray and placed upon the wharf and then shipped by vessel to another port, the wharf owner may charge under this act only four cents per bale ; four cents for shipping, and nothing for landing, as there was no landing.</p> <p>4. Where the legislature has fixed charges for wharfage, the courts cannot consider whether the rates so fixed are reasonable or excessive. Mr. J ustice McIver, dissenting.</p>