Leaman v. Thompson

Citations

• 43 Wash. 579
• 86 P. 926
• 1906 Wash. LEXIS 750

Syllabus

<p>Bbeach oe Maebiage Pbomise — Capacity—Divorce—Subsequent Pbomise — Evidence—Question fob Juey. In an action for the breach of a marriage contract the evidence raises a question for the jury, where although originally the promise of marriage was made while the plaintiff was already married, it appears that, after the disability was removed by a divorce, the defendant again requested the plaintiff to marry him and she agreed to do so, and the defendant for five years repeatedly made remarles in the presence of others that he intended to marry her; and it is also for the jury whether it was only 'the original promise that was relied upon.</p> <p>Same — Disability—Subsequent Pbomise. Although a promise to marry may have been originally made while the plaintiff was under the disability of a former marriage, the defendant is liable for breach of promise if, after the disability is removed by a divorce, he repeats his promise of marriage, and then refuses to perform it.</p> <p>Same — Pleading—Issues. Where a complaint in an action for breach of promise of marriage alleged a promise in 1898, prior to plaintiff’s divorce from her former husband in 1890, further allegations that from time to time thereafter to and including June, 1905, the defendant repeated his promises are sufficient to warrant evidence of a binding promise to marry after the removal of the restrictions.</p> <p>Same — Amendment of Pleadings — To Conform to Proof. In such a case, if an amendment was considered necessary to conform to the proof, it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow it, where the defendant made no objection on the ground of surprise.</p>