Lawson v. Shreveport Waterworks Co.
Citations
- 111 La. 73
- 35 So. 390
- 1903 La. LEXIS 491
Syllabus
<p>HIGHWAY — DEDICATION — REVOCATION—ACCEPTANCE — CHANGE OF LOCATION — USE BY PRESCRIPTION — LICENSE — DEFECTIVE BRIDGE—LIABILITY OF OWNER.</p> <p>1. A person making in his own name some advantage for a third person the condition or consideration of a commutative contract, or onerous donation, cannot, after such third person has availed himself of such advantage, revoke the same.</p> <p>2. In selling the soil, over which a roadway in use hy the public passes, to another, a stipulation, couched in general terms, that the road is to be kept open and a bridge constructed across a small bayou for the use of the road, is to be taken, as a stipulation pour autrui—for the public.</p> <p>3. And the public’s assent to this stipulation in its favor is signified by its continuous use of the road and of the bridge constructed over the bayou.</p> <p>4. When the route of a public road is changed by ordinance of the Police Jury, the old road continues the public highway until the new is laid out, opened and made practicable.</p> <p>5. Prom defendant company’s contractual assumption of the duty to construct a bridge over the bayou, as also from the fact of its interference with the old crossing of the bayou, doing away with such crossing and undertaking to construct a bridge there to take its place, results in law the obligation on its part of constructing such a bridge as would be reasonably safe for the public, using the road, to cross.</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>6. The right of passage is a discontinuous servitude, which can be established only by title.</p> <p>7. In the absence of proof of intention on the part of the owner to dedicate his property to public use, the mere use of the passage by the public cannot supply a title or serve as the basis of prescription.</p> <p>8. Where one knowingly leaves open his property under circumstances calculated to lead others to think that they are invited to use it, he impliedly licenses its use by the public, and assumes- an obligation t
How courts have described this case
Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.
- acknowledging that although an ALJ’s decision need not perfectly correspond with any of the opinions, an ALJ is not a medical professional and is not qualified to assess a claimant's RFC on the basis of bare medical findings
- “Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that it is neither clear nor complete and does not contain a useful assessment of Plaintiff’s physical limitations.”
- an ALJ is not a medical professional and is not qualified to formulate a claimant’s RFC based on the bare medical findings
- an ALJ is not a medical professional and is not qualified to formulate a claimant’s RFC based on the bare medical findings
- “[a]n A.L.J. is not a medical professional, and is not qualified to assess a claimant's RFC on the basis of bare medical findings.”
- “[T]he ALJ may not interpret raw medical data in functional terms”
Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).
Judges: Blanchard, Ease, Land, Monroe, Nigholls
Read full opinion on CourtListenerSourced from CourtListener / Free Law Project (CC0).
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