Laughlin v. Mt. Carmel & Locust Gap Transit Co.

Citations

• 241 Pa. 281
• 88 A. 441
• 1913 Pa. LEXIS 777

Syllabus

<p>Practice, Supreme Court — Paper boohs — Pleadings—Testimony —Act of May 11, 1911, P. L. 279.</p> <p>1. Where the paper book of appellant in the Supreme Court does not contain the body of the evidence, every assumption will be made in favor of a state of facts which would sustain the action of the court below. When counsel desire to take advantage of the Act of May 11, 1911, P. L. 279, giving permission to exclude “any part of the evidence appearing in the transcript,” they must keep in mind that this legislation applies only to such portions of the record as are immaterial to the points brought up for review, and they must not omit parts essential or helpful to a proper determination of the issues of law to be considered by the Supreme Court; an appellant has no right under this act to omit to print pleadings or other writings filed of record in the court below that relate to the appeal or bear upon the questions thereby sought to be raised.</p> <p>Negligence — Street railway companies — Contracts with other companies — Liability for accidents.</p> <p>2. In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, where it appeared that defendant street railway company had entered into a contract with another street railway company, by which for a stipulated sum the latter furnished electric power, employees and some of the cars for transportation of passengers, over a route consisting of defendant’s line- and a small portion of the line of the other company, and that under this contract the latter maintained, operated and controlled defendant’s line, the lower court committed no error in directing a verdict for defendant, it further appearing that plaintiff was injured while a passenger upon a ear belonging not to the defendant, but to the other street railway company, on the latter’s tracks, in the care and custody of its employees, and while riding upon a ticket purchased from it. In such case the defendant railway company could not be held responsible for the damag