Lafayette, Bloomington & Mississippi Railroad v. Winslow

Citations

• 66 Ill. 219

Syllabus

<p>1. Evidence—opinions of witnesses. Where a railroad company sought to condemn city lots with buildings thereon for the use of their road, it was held, that as lands and city lots have no standard value, it was right and necessary to take the opinions of witnesses, and to hear the facts upon which such opinions were founded, to enable the jury to fix the compensation to be awarded to the owners.</p> <p>2. Bight of way—measure of compensation. The law requires that for all the property taken by a railroad company for its use, or damaged by it, just compensation must be made to the owners. If a building stands in the way of the road, which it is necessary to destroy, its value must be paid by the corporation, and the jury, in estimating its value, will take into consideration, not the value of the materials composing the building, but the value of the building as such. Should any of the debris remaining on its removal or destruction be appropriated by the owner of the land, to the extent of its value will the claim of the owner be lessened.</p> <p>3. If asked, the court should instruct the jury to take into considera- • tion the fact, that the corporation acquires only an easement in the land condemned, and they should allow to that fact such importance as they deem proper.</p> <p>4. Same—evidence of trespass and matters of aggravation. On the assessment of the compensation to be paid the owners of land taken for railroad purposes, the court permitted to go to the jury evidence of the violent entry into the premises by the agents and servants of the company, which was detailed at great length, going to show a wilful trespass: Reid, that such evidence was improperly admitted, and that the error was not cured by instructing the jury to disregard it.</p> <p>5. Ebbob—when, substantial justice is done. Where, upon the whole record in any case, this court can see that justice has been done, it will not be inclined to reverse a judgment for mere error in the admission of i