Kirkpatrick v. Taylor

Citations

• 43 Ill. 207

Syllabus

<p>1. Consideration—want of— what constitutes. A plea to an action on a promissory note, which sets forth facts showing that it was given with no other consideration than that of natural affection, presents an unquestionable defense, when pleaded as an original want of consideration.</p> <p>3. Same—natural affection sufficient for a deed, but not for am, executory contract. The law is well settled, that natural affection constitutes a valid consideration for a deed, but not for an executory contract.</p> <p>3. Pleading—a plea which states facts, showing a wmt of consideration — pleaded as a failme of consideration—bad on demurrei'—when assigned as such. On demurrer to a plea in an action on a promissory note, when the plea sets forth, that the note was given by one of the defendants, to secure the support of his mother during her natural life, and for no other consideration and that by a parol agreement the note was to be surrendered at her death, as null and void, and, that she was dead,—Held: That such facts present a good defense, when pleaded as a want of consideration.</p> <p>4. Had the note been originally valid, the parol agreement to surrender it could not destroy its effect, and viewed merely in that respect, and as a plea of failure of consideration, it would be demurrable.</p> <p>5. That portion of the plea setting up the parol agreement, might be rejected as surplusage, and then the remaining fects in the plea, pleaded as a want, instead of a failure of consideration, would have been good both in form and substance.</p> <p>6. The plea being objectionable only for surplusage, and as having been drawn as a plea of failure instead of want of consideration, but this latter defect not having been assigned as cause of demurrer, the plea should have been permitted to stand.</p>