King v. Savage Brick Co.

Citations

• 30 Pa. Super. 582
• 1906 Pa. Super. LEXIS 125

Syllabus

<p>Will — Devise—Rule in Shelley’s case — Remainder—“Children”—Appeals —-Quashing appeal.</p> <p>Testatrix by her will directed as follows: “Whatever other property I may have at the time of my death, whether real, personal or mixed, I give, devise and bequeath as follows, viz.: To my children if I any have at the time of my death. Should I die without issue then to my sister and my husband equally for life, or, in case of my said husband, until he shall marry again. In case of the death or remarriage of my said husband his share is to go to my said sister and in case of the death of my said sister her share is to go to my said husband. Upon the death of both, the whole to go to my brother, and upon his death to his children absolutely and in fee. If my said brother should die without children, then the whole to go to my cousins absolutely in fee,” naming them. Held, (1) that the word “children” in relation to the brother was a word of purchase and not a word of limitation; (2) that the devise to the brother was not an estate tail under the rule in Shelley’s case; (3) that the cousins took the estate in fee upon the remarriage of the husband and the death of both sister and brother without the latter leaving children.</p> <p>In an action of assumpsit brought by the cousins to recover rentals under a mining lease on the property devised as above, the administrator of the brother having written authority to act for the heirs of the brother may be made a party defendant, and if he participates in the case, and takes a joint appeal with the other defendant, the appeal will not be quashed.</p>