King v. Gibson

Citations

• 84 Kan. 29
• 113 P. 429
• 1911 Kan. LEXIS 276

Syllabus

<p>SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.</p> <p>1. Tax Deeds — Conveyance of Separate Tracts — Description of the Land. The case of Spicer v. Howe, 38 Kan. 465, holding that the expression “the real property last hereinbefore described” (p. 468), used in the granting part of a tax deed, included only one tract of several described in the deed, furnishes a rule of interpretation under the following conditions only: The last description must be that of a single tract which is segregated from the others and described wholly apart from them for some independent purpose, and no language must intervene between this description and the operative words of the grant which will extend the application of those words beyond that tract.</p> <p>2. - Same. In the- case of Cartwright v. Korman, 45 Kan. 515, three features of the deed considered were noted as indicating that all the lots described were conveyed. The lots were all sold to one person, they were all described together, and afterward they were spoken of together as “said property.”. But it is not necessary that all these features should be present in a tax deed to warrant the conclusion that all the land sold is conveyed by a grant of “the real property last .hereinbefore described.”-</p> <p>3. WORDS AND Phrases — “The Real Property Last Hereinbefore Described.” The expression “the real property last herein-before described” was inserted in the statutory form of tax deed to designate the property sold as distinguished from the property exposed to sale, when the successful bid is for a less quantity than the whole tract, and to avoid repeating the description of the property sold. Such expression will be deemed to refer to the property sold, unless language be used which diverts it beyond doubt from the whole to some specific portion of such property; and any doubt that the whole is conveyed is removed by collective references to all the property immediately preceding the grant. -</p>