Kimmel v. Shaffer

Citations

• 219 Pa. 375
• 68 A. 1017
• 1908 Pa. LEXIS 581

Syllabus

<p>Ejectment — Proceedings to settle title to land — Possession—Act of June 10, 1893, P. L. 415 — Issue—Parties.</p> <p>The Act of Juno 10, 1893, P. L. 415, was intended to settle title to land as well as possession, and the requirement of sec. 2 as to the petitioner is that he shall be in possession of the land “claiming to hold or own possession of the same by any right or title whatsoever, which right or title or right of possession shall be disputed,” etc. It is not merely the petitioner’s possession which must be disputed and which he may defend under the acts but the title by which his possession is held. A claim of respondent to a contingent right upon the death of the life tenant, who is averred to be a person different from the petitioner although it refers to the future, is still a present dispute of the title by which the petitioner holds possession, and is therefore within the act.</p> <p>In an issue framed under the Act of June 10,1893, P. L. 415, the better practice is to make the petitioner the defendant in the issue, but it is not ground, to reverse the judgment because the respondent was made the defendant. The issue both as to substance and form is under the entire control of the court, to be moulded to fit the requirements of the real controversy between the parties.</p> <p>Deed — Fee tail special — Fee simple estate — Heirs of the body.</p> <p>Where the premises of a deed recite the deed as made between the grantor and his wife and the grantee and his wife “ for their natural lives, and afterward to the heirs begotten from their bodies in fee simple,” and the grant is “unto the said parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns,” the deed will be construed as conveying a fee tail special which the statute converts into a fee simple.</p>