Keogh v. Mayor of Wilmington

Citations

• 4 Del. Ch. 491

Syllabus

<p>There can be no doubt (in the absence of any statutory or charter regulation to the contrary) of the full discretion of any person br corporation even after bids for a proposed work have been received and opened, either wholly to abandon the work, or to alter the plan of it, br to change or amend the specifications and issue new ones.</p> <p>The precise limit of judicial interference with the discretionary powers vested by the Legislature in municipal corporations or their officers is :—that the courts may interpose so far as to protect private rights when violated or threatened by the action of these bodies, also to restrain them from the assumption of powers not granted by their charters, and further, to guard the public interests against any corrupt or fraudulent abuse of the powers granted to them But where'no private right is infringed and the city corporation or its officers are exercising their discretion in good faith, the court will not revise the grounds of their proceedings nor entertain the suggestion that their action is inexpedient for the public interest,</p> <p>' The act of bidding in response to an advertisement containing an express reservation of the right“ to reject any or all bids,” is of itself, a consent to this reserved right and concludes the bidder from any attempt to enforce the acceptance of his bid because it is the lowest.</p> <p>The paving of streets in the City of Wilmington is a discretionary power vested by the charter in the City Council without any expressed restriction whatever, with which when exercised without bad faith or corruption, the courts have no authority to interfere.</p>