Keo Chanmouny v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States

How courts have described this case

Verbatim parenthetical descriptions written by other courts when citing this decision. Ranked by citation-network relevance.

• reasoning that Minnesota terroristic threat statute’s “requisite intent to terrorize [] serves to distinguish Chanmouny’s offense from simple assault” because “[s]imple assault typically is a general intent crime, and it is thus different in character”
• threatening to commit crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another is type of base and depraved behavior that invokes issues of moral turpitude
• observing that simple assault is not a crime of moral turpitude because it “typically is a general intent crime, and it is thus different in character from those offenses FERNANDEZ-RUIZ v. GONZALES 18563 that involve a vicious motive, corrupt mind, or evil intent”
• “Even where an administrative decision embodies ‘less than ideal clarity,’ we may uphold the decision ‘if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” (citation omitted)
• “Even where an administrative decision embodies ‘less than ideal clarity,’ we may uphold the decision ‘if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’”
• \[w]e believe that the crime at issue in this case-threatening a crime of violence against another person with the purpose of causing extreme fear-likewise falls within the category of offenses requiring a vicious motive or evil intent\

Source: CourtListener parenthetical corpus (CC0).